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COMMENT
SAVING TOMORROW FROM TODAY: PRESERVING
INNOVATION IN THE FACE OF COMPULSORY
LICENSING
SAMUEL MARK BOROWSKI∗
ABSTRACT
This Comment describes a compensation method for use with
pharmaceutical compulsory licenses. Specifically, it proposes a method for determining “adequate remuneration” under the TRIPS
agreement in a way that balances intellectual property rights with
government obligations to promote the public health. Beginning with
an introduction to U.S. patent law and its economic justifications, it
describes the effects of U.S. policy choices on innovation within the
U.S. pharmaceutical industry. Next, it describes the need for access to
medicines in countries like South Africa and explains how patents
block access in these countries—thereby necessitating compulsory licensing. Given the relationship between trade and intellectual property, this nexus is briefly described and followed by a short introduction
to the TRIPS agreement and the subsequent Doha Declaration. With
this background in mind, and confined by the TRIPS requirements,
this Comment describes a method for determining “adequate remuneration” so that courts can balance the need for technological innovation with the need to access essential medicines, making both realities
for the future.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is an emerging trend in the world, and some paint it as a
threat to our future welfare.1 That trend is the growing use of compulsory licenses in order to provide domestic generic pharmaceuticals. These painters of a bleaker tomorrow complain not because
compulsory licenses are forbidden, but because they are being used
by the wrong parties and for the wrong reasons. Consequently, they
warn, the widespread use of compulsory licenses could cost us our future pharmaceutical resources, leaving us defenseless against tomorrow’s diseases.2
A compulsory license is not a popular solution to any problem, but
it is one the international community has endorsed in limited circumstances. Recently, for example, the community has authorized its
poorest countries to use compulsory licensing as a means for battling
diseases like HIV/AIDS, but only after certain conditions are met.3
As the critics point out though, some countries are exploiting this
freedom. Rather than use compulsory licenses to promote the public
health, some countries appear to be using them to lower the costs for
their own domestic pharmaceutical industries. By doing so, these
countries shift costs to others who have made substantial investments in research and, by denying them the opportunity to recoup
those investments, are hindering ongoing efforts aimed at battling
tomorrow’s diseases.4
This shifting of costs was not the policy behind compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals. Instead, the international community
1. See, e.g., A Gathering Storm, ECONOMIST, June 9, 2007, at 71.
2. See id. (quoting the chairman of Novartis as saying that “ ‘without intellectual
property there is no innovation’ ”).
3. See infra Part III (discussing the current international compromise regarding
compulsory licenses).
4. At the forefront of those bearing these costs are large pharmaceutical companies
who, fearing they will lose their investment in research, warn that compulsory licenses deny them the resources necessary for continued innovation. Standing with them are countries like the United States who, having invested in intellectual property to drive technological innovation, lose their international trade advantages when their technology is seized
by other countries despite these countries’ capacity to pay. For a detailed discussion of the
relations between compulsory licenses and their costs, see infra Part II.B.
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adopted a policy that endorsed increased access to medicines for
those who otherwise could not afford them by balancing access,
which occurs through lower costs,5 with innovation, which is driven
by intellectual property (IP) protection.6 In doing so, the international community empowered individual countries to make decisions regarding their own public welfare; but when some countries refuse to
pay for their fair share of innovation, they upset the balance and put
future medicines at risk. Moreover, because a compulsory license
shifts costs, it distorts international trade and causes developed
countries to implement trade barriers to protect their IP advantages.
In the end, compulsory licenses are often blocked and their lifesaving benefits denied to those who need them most.
Thus, there is a need to bring the international solution back into
balance, and this Comment examines how to do so by interpreting
the compensation standard at the consequential end of the compulsory license decision. Specifically, this Comment proposes a compensation standard that minimizes the cost-shifting aspects of a compulsory license so that research will not be hindered and trade will not
be distorted. In doing so, it describes the essential conflicts in the international patent system, outlines the current international compromise, and concludes by proposing a method for compensation that
will balance the interests at stake.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM: INNOVATION, ACCESS,
AND TRADE
In the international arena, differing economic maturities spawn a
very complex patent system. In a developed economy, patents vigorously protect technology because of policy choices sourced in the local interest, particularly that of the domestic innovator who relies on
the patent to recoup investments in research and development.7
In a developing economy, however, there is less technology to
protect, and the local interest resides not in protection of technology,
but in access to technology so that it may be borrowed for the benefit
of developing industry.8 For this reason, patents are disfavored, but
when patents protect medicines, their negative effects on the public
health make them even less appealing. For example, in those
developing countries that are helpless before diseases like
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part II (outlining the role of patent protection in driving innovation and
the role of compulsory licenses in improving access).
7. KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 102
(2000) (stating that inventors require stronger IP protection in a developed economy and
drive demand for stronger IP rights).
8. Id. at 105 (explaining data that shows weak IP protection is correlated with developing economies).
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HIV/AIDS,9 patents raise the prices of essential medicines and put
them out of reach for dying patients. This takes an unacceptable
toll on the rights of individuals to life and health, and as more resources are directed to treating the disease, it cripples an already
struggling economy.10
As a result, and as described below using the United States and
South Africa as examples of countries from both ends of the economic
spectrum, the conflicting local interests of the innovator and the
struggling poor result in international pressures that materialize in
international trade, eventually erupting into a conflagration.11
A. The U.S. Patent System and the Domestic
Pharmaceutical Industry
The United States exemplifies a country with a well-developed
economy and one that uses patents to protect its technology,12 maximize its trade advantages,13 and promote future innovation within
its industries.14 This latter goal underlies the application of its patent
laws, and the resulting system, many argue, is essential to innovating tomorrow’s medicines.15

9. See, e.g., JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, 2006 REPORT ON THE GLOBAL
AIDS EPIDEMIC 4 fig.1.1 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS],
available at http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2006 (displaying the growing number of orphaned children in sub-Saharan Africa as a result of
HIV/AIDS on that continent).
10. See generally INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS AND
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES (Fredrick M. Abbott et al. eds., 2006) (containing articles that address
the impact of patent protection on human rights). The social cost arises from the temporary grant of the monopoly to the innovator that accompanies the patent. By enabling the
innovator to market his or her invention at a price higher than a directly competitive market would allow, the patent provides the innovator a certain degree of pricing power. Given
this pricing power, there is the possibility that the innovator may price out a large segment
of the population. When the patent is protecting medicines, this practice can harm the public health and, with it, economic productivity. See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See MASKUS, supra note 7, at 102.
13. See Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales
and the Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 369 (1993) (“Under the theory of comparative advantage, a
nation competes by taking advantage of those production factors which they possess in abundance; thus nonprotection of intellectual property distorts trade, for it provides the pirate with an artificial competitive advantage.”).
14. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003) (discussing the role of patents in spurring innovation in multiple industries, particularly in the pharmaceutical,
biotechnology, computer hardware, and computer software industries).
15. See infra Part II.A.2.
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Patents, as an exception to the monopoly prohibition,16 are difficult to understand and enforce without also understanding the policy
choices behind them. Existing at the intersection of the collective interest and the individual right,17 they can be justified on several
grounds.18 Yet, while anyone analyzing their role within the overall
economy may find it hard to endorse the creation of a patent system,19 it survives because it provides an incentive for innovation that
promotes the public good.20 As the Court explained in Mazer v.
Stein,21 “[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance [the] public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ ”22
Accordingly, armed with this conviction23 and constitutional empowerment,24 Congress has enacted a statutory patent scheme25 that
strives to advance the public welfare through the disclosure of technical information26 and provide incentives to invent27 that harmonize

16. See 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Senator Sherman, sponsor of the
Sherman Act) (describing the patent on the Senate Floor as “[a] limited monopoly secured
by a patent right is an admitted exception, for this is the only way by which an inventor
can be paid for his invention”).
17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 238-39 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1894) (describing the Constitution’s patent and copyright clause as one sourced at the intersection of
the individual right and the public good since “[t]he public good fully coincides in both cases, with the claims of individuals”).
18. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 2-20 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing multiple justifications, including those
based on Natural Rights and Hegel’s Property Theory, both of which are beyond the scope
of this Comment).
19. See SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY NO. 15
58-62 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by F. Machlup) [hereinafter ECONOMIC REVIEW].
20. See WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PATENT REFORM: ISSUES IN THE
BIOMEDICAL AND SOFTWARE INDUSTRIES 2 (2006) (“Patent ownership is perceived to be an
incentive to innovation, the basis for the technological advancement that contributes to
economic growth.”).
21. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
22. Id. at 219; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974)
(describing the patent grant as an incentive for inventors to risk both time and effort in the
development of new products and processes so that, as a result, the public will benefit
through increased employment and better livelihood from their introduction into society).
23. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (patent and copyright clause).
25. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
26. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
27. See SCHACHT, supra note 20, at 4 (describing the two policy goals of the patent
system as encouraging inventors to disclose technical information while also providing
them with an incentive to invent).
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with its underlying philosophy.28 Under this system, in exchange for
the full disclosure29 of a product or process30 that is useful,31 novel,32
and nonobvious,33 the inventor receives a patent whose accompanying bundle of rights is enforceable for twenty years after the patent’s
filing date.34
Amongst this bundle of rights, the most valuable is the right to
exclude others from making or using the patented product or
process.35 This exclusionary right enables the patent holder to recoup
the original investment in the patented invention by prohibiting others from practicing the invention and competing with the innovator

28. According to the 1966 Report of the President’s Commission on the Patent System, there are four major economic justifications underlying the patent system:
First, a patent system provides an incentive to invent by offering the possibility
of reward to the inventor and to those who support him. This prospect encourages the expenditure of time and private risk capital in research and development efforts.
Second, and complementary to the first, a patent system stimulates the investment of additional capital needed for the further development and marketing of the invention. In return, the patent owner is given the right, for a limited
period, to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invented product or
process.
Third, by affording protection, a patent system encourages early public disclosure of technological information, some of which might otherwise be kept secret. Early disclosure reduces the likelihood of duplication of effort by others
and provides a basis for further advances in the technology involved.
Fourth, a patent system promotes the beneficial exchange of products, services,
and technological information across national boundaries by providing protection for industrial property of foreign nationals.
MERGES ET AL., supra note 18, at 17.
29. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining the category of patentable subject matter very
broadly as any “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any . . . improvement thereof”).
31. Id.; see also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528-29, 534 (1966) (stating that
“one may patent only that which is ‘useful’ ” and describing utility as a necessary quid pro
quo for the monopoly granted through the patent because it is the utility that benefits
the public).
32. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (requiring novelty); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (defining novelty).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000); see also MERGES ET AL., supra note 18, at 124, 225 (describing nonobviousness as the “ ‘ultimate condition of patentability’ ” and stating that it requires an “ ‘inventive leap’ ” over what has previously been done to justify the grant of
strong rights that accompany a patent).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
35. Id. § 154(a)(1) (defining the exclusionary right as the “right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States, and if the invention is a process, of the
right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United
States, or importing into the United States, products made by that process”).
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on the market.36 If such competition arises during the statutory patent term, then the patent holder can enforce this right with a private cause of action37 and seek statutory remedies38 in the forms of
damages,39 injunctions,40 and sometimes attorneys’ fees.41
It is the enforcement of this exclusionary right that, like the enforcement of most rights under the law, sheds the most light on the
patent system’s underlying policies and complexities.42 And, when enforcing this right, courts tend to rely on injunctions rather than
damages43 partly because Congress has chosen patents as a vehicle to
promote innovation44 and partly because patented technology is difficult to valuate.45 In taking this route, a court preserves the patent’s
right to exclude because doing so blocks ongoing infringement and
gives a potentially infringing party reason to license the patent in
order to continue practicing the patented technology.46 Moreover, a
court avoids the valuation problem because, when licensing the patent, the injunction places the patent holder in a superior bargaining

36. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 18, at 1102.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). One noted exception is for doctors performing an infringing medical activity. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2000).
38. Believing a private transaction is preferable to a legal one, some argue that a full
range of remedies, including the infringer’s profits, should be available to the patent owner
because it would make any contemplated infringement worthless and force a would-be infringer to negotiate with the patent holder rather than infringe and await the legal consequence. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 7-8 (2003). The idea that an infringer’s profits should be a
damages measure has not been codified. However, damages can be enhanced up to three
times the amount assessed. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
39. 35 U.S.C. § 284 sets the floor for damages at a reasonable royalty and allows for
an increase in damages of up to three times the amount found.
40. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000).
42. A noted example of how policy choices can determine legal outcomes is found in
Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), where the majority of the court, which favored certainty, and the dissenting Judge Livingston, who favored the eradication of such
“noxious beasts,” each came to separate and opposite legal conclusions.
43. MERGES ET AL., supra note 18, at 336. The Court has explicitly held, however, that
the injunction is not the preferred remedy in an infringement action. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006). Instead, underscoring the statutory language
that injunctions “may” issue “in accordance with the principles of equity,” 35 U.S.C. § 283,
and that their issuance is subject to the trial court’s discretion, see eBay, 547 U.S. at 394,
the Court has emphasized the traditional four factor test that a plaintiff must meet prior
to the issuance of an injunction. See id.
44. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting “the difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies”).
45. This difficulty is referred to as the valuation problem. See generally MERGES ET
AL., supra note 18, at 336; ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON LICENSING § 2.79 (Matthew
Bender 1990) (2008) (noting “that proof of damages is at best a difficult and elusive task”).
46. For a general discussion of the economics behind injunctions and their costs and
benefits when compared to damage remedies, see Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co.,
966 F.2d 273, 275-76 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.).
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position47 where he or she can set a value on the patent and the
terms and conditions surrounding its use.48
The right to exclude, however, does not end there. As a corollary of
its strength, courts have held that a patent holder has full prerogative and can refuse a license, should his or her terms be rejected,
without fear of compulsion from the government.49 In other words, in
the United States, while the government is free to issue compulsory
licenses, it is rare that it will.50 In fact, the only times that courts will
favor this route are when there is evidence of anticompetitive conduct51 or when legislation is triggered that protects the public interest.52 In the special case, the public interest prong of the four factor

47. Although its holding that the injunction was a preferred remedy in a patent infringement action was reversed, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit described a
natural consequence of the exclusionary right as the patent holder’s increased leverage in
bargaining. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d,
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
48. MERGES ET AL., supra note 18, at 336-37.
49. MILGRIM, supra note 45, § 8.55 (“In general, given the patentee’s freedom to refuse
to license his invention, compulsory licensing is not a remedy available to an aggrieved
competitor. In the usual case, therefore, absent some injurious or illegal conduct beyond
the mere unilateral refusal to license, compulsory licenses will not be ordered either in private suits or in government enforcement actions.” (citations omitted)).
50. A compulsory license is a license issued by the government against the patent
holder’s will. Edmund J. Sease, Common Sense, Nonsense and the Compulsory License, 55
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 233, 233 (1973); see also John M. Wechkin, Drug Price Regulation and
Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents: The New Zealand Connection, 5 PAC.
RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 237, 239 (1995) (“A compulsory license . . . is an involuntary contract between an unwilling patent holder and a willing licensee, imposed and enforced by the state.”).
51. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 94 (1950) (granting compulsory licenses for violations of the Sherman Act); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,
323 U.S. 386, 419 (1945) (granting compulsory licenses to alleged infringers when patentee
violated the Sherman Act). See generally MILGRIM, supra note 45, § 8.55 (stating that “the
rule of general application remains fixed: absent other anticompetitive conduct or public
policy considerations, a patentee is free to unilaterally refuse to license and compulsory licensing will not be ordered”).
52. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2000) (stating that when a patent is necessary for implementing a certain provision of the Clean Air Act, a court “may
issue an order requiring the person who owns such patent to license it on such reasonable
terms and conditions as the court, after hearing, may determine”); Atomic Energy Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2183(b) (2000) (allowing for the licensing of patents relating to atomic energy and
effected with the public interest); Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2000) (allowing for the denial of injunctive relief when it is in the public interest to all others to
grow the protected plant); Instances of Gov’t Subsidy, 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2000) (giving the
federal government “march-in rights” for patents that were developed as part of a federal
funding agreement). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which has traditionally not been viewed as
a compulsory license, but instead as an exercise of eminent domain. Sease, supra note 50,
at 239. When 28 U.S.C. § 1498 is invoked and a patented invention is used or manufactured by or for the United States without a license or other lawful right, the patent owner’s
sole remedy is the recovery of reasonable compensation.
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test for injunctive relief53 can also be triggered,54 and when it is, a
court may favor damages over an injunction.55 When it does, a court,
in effect, issues a compulsory license.56
Nevertheless, such outcomes are rare, and according to the
Supreme Court, this evidences a legislative intent against compulsory licensing and favors the patent holder.57 This means that in the
United States, without a general duty to license the patent,58 the patent holder rests securely in the exercise of his or her patent rights.59
As a result, this security, which is sourced in the patent’s right to exclude and Congress’s choice to use IP to drive innovation, grants the
patent holder a limited monopoly in the invention and,
as described below, encourages inventors to invent so that society
can benefit.60

53. 35 U.S.C. § 283 does not require a court to issue an injunction, but instead allows
the court to issue injunctive orders in accordance with the principles of equity and on
terms that the court deems reasonable.
54. See Sease, supra note 50, for a general survey of compulsory licensing incidents
and the rationale behind their issue. These instances include the following: (1) those where
equity finds an injunction to be inappropriate, see, e.g., Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry
Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974) (affirming the issuance of a compulsory license
while describing the injunction as an inappropriate remedy when it would result in irreparable injury to the infringer without giving any resulting benefit to the patentee other
than a “club” to be wielded in negotiation); (2) instances where nonuse by the patentee intrudes on the public interest, see, e.g., Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S.
405, 405, 430 (1908) (noting that the patentee’s nonuse is not reason alone to deny injunctive relief, but when a public interest is at stake because of the nonuse, injunctive relief
may be denied); (3) instances where an infringement order would result in waste and denial of a public benefit, see, e.g., McCreery Eng’g Co. v. Mass. Fan Co., 180 F. 115 (D. Mass.
1910) (denying injunctive relief when it would result in the loss of ventilation to county
courthouse); and (4) instances where an injunction would place the public health, welfare,
and safety at risk, see, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th
Cir. 1934) (denying injunction when it would result in the shutdown of a city sewage plant
and the dumping of raw sewage into Lake Michigan).
55. In all such instances, upon the finding of infringement, the patent holder is entitled to “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty.” 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
56. MILGRIM, supra note 45, § 8.55 (stating that the “refusal to enjoin future infringement in such a case is tantamount to a mandatory license”).
57. Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 429-30 (interpreting the lack of legislative activity in the area of compulsory licensing as reflecting Congress’s intent not to have general
compulsory licensing).
58. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (noting that
“[c]ompulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system, and we decline to manufacture
such a requirement”); see also id. at 215 n.21 (“Compulsory licensing of patents often has
been proposed, but it has never been enacted on a broad scale.”).
59. Adi Gillat, Compulsory Licensing to Regulated Licensing: Effects of the Conflict
Between Innovation and Access in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
711, 714 (2003) (stating that patent holders have “full prerogative . . . in exercising their
patent rights”).
60. See SCHACHT, supra note 20, at 2.
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Patents benefit society in a number of ways, and although their
specific role in each industry is unique, they are generally recognized
for their ability to spur innovation.61 In the pharmaceutical industry,
for example, patents are essential to motivating and directing future
innovation,62 which generates new and better medicines for all.63
The incentive to innovate and invent is a function of four
interrelated variables: (1) the costs of innovation and invention, (2)
the risks, (3) the rewards for success, and (4) the rate at which competitive imitation occurs.64 In the pharmaceutical industry, the patent preserves this incentive because after developing a new drug,
patenting it provides a substantial reward that offsets the high costs
of success.
Developing a new drug is extraordinarily expensive and highly
unlikely to succeed. At least one author has indicated that the costs
of developing a new drug can approach half a billion dollars while requiring more than a decade to research, test, and obtain regulatory
approval.65 Similarly, another author has discovered that only one
percent of compounds researched make it into human testing and
that because only twenty-two percent of those obtain approval from
the Federal Drug Administration (FDA),66 the odds of a discovered
compound becoming an approved drug can be as low as one out of
four thousand.67
Therefore, to preserve the incentive to innovate, patents serve a
reward function that offsets the high costs and extraordinary risks
61. See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI.
173, 180 (1986). See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14 (comparing the role of
patents in promoting innovation across multiple industries).
62. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch. 3.
63. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing how patents generate
social returns in excess of their costs).
64. See F.M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING
14 (1977).
65. Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Patent Protection and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 29 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POL. 95, 95 (1996). Although the numbers cited by Bale are more than a decade old, time has not eroded their validity. In late 2006, the Congressional Budget Office
reported that developing and bringing to market an innovative drug takes about 12 years
and it takes an average of 11.8 years for a type of drug known as a new molecular entity.
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2, 20 (2006) [hereinafter RESEARCH IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY], available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D.pdf.
66. Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals, 5 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 849, 851 (2002); see also RESEARCH IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 65, at 23 fig. 3-2 (reporting that about twenty percent of new molecular entities
actually enter the phase for FDA approval).
67. Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: An Unreasonable
Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295, 303 (1994).
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involved with bringing a new drug to market. That reward is a limited monopoly grant that gives innovative companies the freedom
to include both production costs and other expenses in the price of
their drugs68 and positions them to appropriate at least part of their
drugs’ social value.69 According to pharmaceutical representatives70
and bolstered by studies,71 this freedom preserves continued innovation within the industry.
In addition to providing a reward for success, patents fill a gap in
legal protection and stifle competitive imitators that could otherwise
copy the drug at less cost and risk than the innovator.72 Unlike the
development of a new drug, which is a risky endeavor taking as long
as fifteen years73 to research and costing as much as half a billion
dollars,74 the development of a brand-name equivalent drug is a highly successful endeavor costing as little as $1 to $2 million and can
take only a few years.75 This places the imitator at a competitive advantage because, even though the imitator and innovator share the
same marginal costs,76 the imitator pays substantially less for research and can sell the brand-name equivalent drug at a discount.77

68. Id. at 304. Although the patent rewards the inventor with a monopoly on the new
drug, it does not confer a monopoly on the treatment of a disease. Drug companies are still
forced to compete with other drugs in the same therapeutic class, which limits the monopoly effect granted by the patent. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 10.
69. See Grabowski, supra note 66, at 850 (indicating that pharmaceutical companies
rely greatly on patents in order to appropriate the benefits from their invention).
70. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 1.
71. See Mansfield, supra note 61, at 174 (citing studies that found ninety percent
of pharmaceutical innovations would not have been introduced without patents, and sixty
percent of pharmaceutical research and development funding was dependent upon patent
protection); see also id. at 177 tbl. 2 (indicating that pharmaceutical companies patented
more than eighty percent of their inventions from 1981 to 1983, which indicates their
reliance on patents); id. at 175 tbl.1 (noting that of those inventions patented between
1981 and 1983, sixty-five percent would not have been introduced if patent protection was
not obtained, and sixty percent would not have been developed if patent protection was
not available).
72. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
73. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 5.
74. Bale, supra note 65, at 95.
75. Grabowski, supra note 66, at 852.
76. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 38, at 313 (noting that in the pharmaceutical
industry, marginal costs are low both for the innovator and the imitator). Marginal costs
are the costs incurred for producing additional units of a particular good. Costs for labor
and material are examples of marginal costs. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 48
(5th ed. 2003).
77. See Grabowski, supra note 66, at 851 (stating that “imitation costs . . . are extremely low relative to the innovator’s costs for discovering and developing a new compound”); see also Bale, supra note 65, at 101, 106 tbl. 2 (showing how quickly imitators of
the drug Tagamet (Cimetidine) took market share because their prices were so much lower).
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This is known as “free-riding,” and though it saves the consumer
money,78 it limits the innovator’s ability to recover the original investment and attract additional resources for continued research.79
To prevent this problem, patents step in where other forms of legal
protection fail.80 In particular, pharmaceuticals find little protection
as a trade secret because they are easily imitated81 and require extensive disclosure prior to regulatory approval.82 They are also not
subject to copyright,83 and trademark law offers only a limited
amount of protection after a significant period of time on the market.84
Therefore, without patent protection, innovative companies would
have no means of preventing imitating companies from cheaply
producing their drugs,85 and imitating competitors could enter the
market freely and quickly erode the innovator’s early entry advantage.86 The patent’s exclusionary right stifles this competition by
granting a limited monopoly in the invention and secures the innovator in the market.87 As a result, in the absence of competition, the
innovator can recover fixed costs,88 regain previously invested re-

78. See Grabowski, supra note 66, at 851 (indicating that a generic drug does not have
to recoup research and development costs like its brand-name equivalent and is cheaper as
a result).
79. See SCHERER, supra note 64, at 20 (explaining that when imitation is swift and
widespread, the imitators—and not the innovator—will reap most of the social gains as a
result of the price competition); see also infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (describing how patents are essential to funding research).
80. See ECONOMIC REVIEW, supra note 19, at 58-62 (describing the patent system as
being designed to prevent free-riding).
81. See SCHACHT, supra note 20, at 5 (noting that it is relatively easy to chemically
analyze and duplicate a pill, and for this reason, patents are especially important to pharmaceuticals); see also Wechkin, supra note 50, at 241 (noting that “[p]harmaceuticals . . .
are particularly easy to copy because ‘reverse engineering’ methods can be used to determine the constituent components of the drug”).
82. Gillat, supra note 59, at 723 (noting that the detailed disclosure requirements necessary for a drug’s regulatory approval deny the drug protection through trade secrecy).
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
84. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 38, at 314 (describing how a drug’s trademark,
in conjunction with the patent, creates reluctance in the consumer to leave the brand-name
drug for the cheaper generic drug when the patent expires).
85. This may be an overstatement since circumstances may provide alternative remedies under state law. The point is, however, that even in light of these remedies, none are
as effective or as broad as those provided by a patent.
86. See SCHERER, supra note 64, at 23 (noting that an additional barrier to competition is the advantage that accrues to the pioneer who is first to place an innovative product
on the market); Bale, supra note 65, at 101 (stating that when generic manufacturers enter
the market, they quickly erode the innovator’s market share); see also, e.g., Theodore C.
Bailey, Innovation and Access: The Role of Compulsory Licensing in the Development and
Distribution of HIV/AIDS Drugs, 2001 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 193, 204 (recalling that when
the patent expired for the drug Librium, a precursor to Valium, its price dropped from $15
to $1); Bale, supra note 65, at 106 tbl.2 (reflecting that when Tagamet’s patent expired, the
patent holder’s market share declined from 100% to 45% in eight weeks).
87. See ECONOMIC REVIEW, supra note 19, at 58-62.
88. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 4.
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search and development funds,89 and attract additional resources for
future research.90
Besides attracting resources, a pharmaceutical patent has other
beneficial effects. That is, the disclosure required of a pharmaceutical
patent can maximize innovation efforts in ways beyond those that
are directly beneficial to the patent holder.91 Using the information
disclosed in the patent, competing companies can maximize innovative research by minimizing duplication and directing efforts into
areas not previously claimed.92 Similarly, after knowing what
technology a patent protects, competing companies can “design
around” the patent and develop noninfringing competition to the
patented product.93
In the end, the fruits of these innovation efforts arrive to the market in the form of new drugs that benefit society.94 As has been reported, from 1981 to 1990, the pharmaceutical industry introduced
over ninety percent of new FDA approved drugs,95 and when compared to companies in countries with only “intermediate” patent protection, U.S. companies outpaced them more than two to one.96 Similarly, when looking at the effects of strong patent protection in other
89. See id.; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 38, at 313 (stating that thirty percent of the cost of a new drug is related to research and development). Despite the patent
monopoly, industry representatives have testified that most drugs do not generate enough
in profit to cover their average development costs. As a result, brand-name companies rely
on a small number of “ ‘blockbuster’ ” drugs to recoup their innovation investments, including those made for failed products. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 5.
90. RESEARCH IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 65, at 9-10 (noting that
sales revenue drives research and development and reporting in Fig. 2-2 how the pharmaceutical industry’s level of investment compares to other industries); Bale, supra note 65,
at 97-98 (indicating that the “ ‘research-based’ ” segment of the pharmaceutical industry
depends upon patents and that even though patent protection results in a “ ‘monopoly’ effect,” this effect is necessary to fund the substantial investments in research and development that are required for new drug development); Fisch, supra note 67, at 302 n.49 (reporting that in 1994, spending for research and development was projected to be 18.8% of
company sales in the pharmaceutical industry).
91. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (requiring disclosure that would enable a person skilled
in the art to make and use the invention); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch.
3, at 9 (describing the disclosure requirement as a trade-off for obtaining the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling an invention). This disclosure
requirement harmonizes with the patent system’s underlying objectives. See supra note 28.
92. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 1.
93. Id. at 1-2.
94. This argument depends upon an inventor being motivated by the prospect of
commercial success. There are exceptions where this will not always prove true. For example, it has been suggested that partly because Alexander Fleming was not motivated by
commercial success, it took an additional fifteen years to commercialize penicillin and to
make it available for the market. See George E. Frost, The Case Against Drug Patent Compulsory Licensing, 7 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. RES. & EDUC. 84, 100 (1963).
95. Fisch, supra note 67, at 302 n.46.
96. See Frost, supra note 94, at 98 (summarizing that during one specified period, for
every drug produced in Great Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy combined,
the United States was producing more than two).
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countries, the conclusion is much the same—strong patents lead to
more and better drugs.97
For society, this means that even though pharmaceutical patents
impose social costs, society reaps the greater benefit because new
and better drugs increase longevity, enhance the quality of life,
and improve both labor force participation and productivity.98 Thus,
while the patent system allows the inventor to appropriate the social
value of his or her invention in the form of a private return,99 the reality is that the inventor’s return falls short and society reaps the
greater benefit.100
B. Patents in the Developing World: Access and the
Compulsory License
While countries like the United States reap the benefits of better
drugs and can afford to grant strong patent protection to their innovators, the reach of their patents and associated rights are limited.101
This leaves an innovator seeking foreign patent protection at the
mercy of individual patent systems.102 Because patents are a reflection of policy, their associated rights can vary according to the choices of individual countries.103 Thus, while the United States prefers
strong patent rights to spur innovation,104 developing countries find
them unpalatable, particularly when dealing with medicines essential to the long-term survival of their people. As a result, they endorse choices that erode IP rights and entangle themselves in international disputes.
1. The Clash Between Innovation and Access
Unlike in the United States, in a developing economy, strong patent enforcement is not generally seen as a tool for promoting the
public welfare. Instead, patents impede economic growth and impose

97. Grabowski, supra note 66, at 853-54 (arguing that strong patent protection for
drugs is essential to new product introductions and to the prosperity of the drug industry
while also summarizing the effects of stronger patent protection on the drug industries in
Canada and Japan).
98. Id. at 849-50.
99. See ECONOMIC REVIEW, supra note 19, at 58-62.
100. See Gillat, supra note 59, at 715 (citing studies that conclude that the typical innovator captures, at most, only forty-five percent of the social returns on his or her innovation).
101. Wechkin, supra note 50, at 239 (noting that patents are limited to the jurisdiction
of the laws in the issuing country).
102. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 18, at 330 (stating that most businesses seeking international patent protection turn to the laws of individual countries in order to obtain
that protection).
103. Compare supra notes 42-60 and accompanying text with infra notes 105-30 and
accompanying text.
104. See supra Part II.A.
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social costs in excess of any gains they could be expected to return.105
To control these effects, a developing country must intervene through
negotiation with the patent holder or intrusion on the patent, and
more often than not, intrusion in the form of a compulsory license is
likely the best course for pharmaceutical patents.106
When a developing country issues patents for foreign medicines,
its already struggling economy finds itself shouldering another load.
Specifically, granting a patent for a foreign product can cost an economy technological advantages that would otherwise promote its industry and benefit its citizens. In terms of industry, productivity is
lost when patents prevent imitators from pirating the technology for
local production,107 and when local production is denied, there is no
opportunity for technology transfer.108 This leaves local consumers
dependent on foreign goods without the benefit of local competition,
and absent competition, consumers are forced to pay higher prices.109
When these goods are medicines, these higher prices injure the public health because when drugs are not readily available, treating and
diagnosing disease is more difficult.110
Consequently, a developing country facing a health crisis finds itself in a difficult position. To provide access to medicines that would
combat the crisis, it can take a passive approach and rely on drug
donations from charities and pharmaceutical companies.111 Alterna105. EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM
226 (1951) (noting that granting patents on foreign imports results in social costs such as
higher prices, royalty payments to foreign patent holders, and the lost ability to use new
techniques that far exceed any benefit derived from granting the patent protection).
106. There are two methods of reducing social costs that result from granting patents
on foreign inventions. Id. at 230. One is the ineffective compulsory working requirement.
Id. The other is the more effective and flexible compulsory licensing requirement mentioned here. Id. at 231.
107. See Julian-Arnold, supra note 13, at 356 (citing sources and explaining the effects
of piracy and counterfeiting on the economies in developing countries).
108. See id. at 357. As a result of this concern, developing countries have contracted
directly with pharmaceutical companies to have them build domestic production facilities
in order to achieve technology transfer as well as to spur the developing country’s technical
capacity. Thomas F. Mullin, AIDS, Anthrax, and Compulsory Licensing: Has the United
States Learned Anything? A Comment on Recent Decisions on the International Intellectual
Property Rights of Pharmaceutical Patents, 9 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 185,
192 (2002).
109. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (describing how patents enable the
patent holder to charge higher prices to recoup past expenses and to gather future funds
for research and development).
110. See Thomas J. Bollyky, Balancing Private Rights and Public Obligations: Constitutionally Mandated Compulsory Licensing of HIV/AIDS Related Treatments in South
Africa, 18 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 530, 531 (2002).
111. See, e.g., Jeanne Whalen, Glaxo to Cut Prices in Poor Countries, WALL ST. J., Feb.
14, 2009, at B5 (“GlaxoSmithKline PLC, the world’s second-biggest drug maker by sales,
plans to cut prices in the world’s poorest countries and invest 20% of its profit from those
markets into building health clinics and other infrastructure.”); see Bollyky, supra note
110, at 537; Grabowski, supra note 66, at 857-58.
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tively, it can be proactive and negotiate bilaterally, purchase in bulk,
or issue compulsory licenses.112
Of these choices, the availability of limited funds for medical
treatment often leaves compulsory licensing as the only choice for
those countries wishing to be proactive. In Africa, for example, where
HIV/AIDS is ravaging the population, its nations are limited to
budgets of less than ten dollars per capita for medicines annually.113
Meanwhile, the annual price of treatment for the disease can be as
high as several thousand dollars a year.114 This means that while bilateral negotiations115 and bulk purchasing efforts116 enable a country
to achieve some price reductions, the savings they generate are often
not enough to make it worthwhile.117 A compulsory license, on the
other hand, increases the government’s bargaining power,118 opens
the door to more competition, and leads to significant price reductions.119 For this reason, although compulsory licenses are rare,120 the
promise of immediate cost savings make them very appealing for

112. See Bollyky, supra note 110, at 533, 537.
113. Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 26.
114. Bailey, supra note 86, at 196 (describing that access to AIDS drugs is almost
impossible in nations like South Africa where the annual per capita income is $6,000 and
a year’s supply of AIDS treatment can cost more than $750 a month and up to $12,000
a year).
115. See, e.g., Mullin, supra note 108, at 200-02 (discussing how the United States and
Canada negotiated with Bayer AG to lower the price of Cipro, the first FDA approved drug
for treating Anthrax infections, after the Anthrax attacks in 2001).
116. See, e.g., Wechkin, supra note 50, at 238 (discussing how New Zealand has placed
increased reliance on price regulation as a means for controlling drug prices).
117. See Grabowski, supra note 66, at 856 (noting that low prices on drugs alone do
not result in adequate utilization of those drugs because of the limited funds available
for medicines).
118. See, e.g., Ubirajara Regis Quintanilha Marques et al., Brazil AIDS Controversy:
Antiretroviral Drugs, Breaking Patents, and Compulsory Licensing, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
471, 474 (2005) (indicating that the mere possibility of a compulsory license pressures
global pharmaceutical companies to lower their prices); Mullin, supra note 108, at 192-94
(discussing the increased bargaining power that the South African government enjoyed after it contemplated the use of compulsory licensing and the significant savings that resulted because drug manufacturers were much more willing to lower their prices to avoid
the license).
119. “The effect of a compulsory license is to force a patent holder to license the invention to others in return for a royalty set by the government.” Wechkin, supra note 50, at
237. Through the issuance of the license, competition is stimulated and prices are lowered
because of the availability of low-priced generics that are manufactured or imported by
third party licensees. Bollyky, supra note 110, at 533.
120. Sease, supra note 50, at 236. The rare instances when compulsory licensing has
been used include those “where a dependent patent is being blocked, where a patent is not
being worked, or where an invention is related to food or medicine.” Julian-Arnold, supra
note 13, at 349-50 (summarizing compulsory licensing provisions in selected countries); see
also ECONOMIC REVIEW, supra note 19, at 13 (stating that, in addition to using compulsory
licenses as a penalty or remedy for abuse, some countries use them “to safeguard the public interest”); Sease, supra note 50, at 235 (describing compulsory licensing as being used
in foreign countries as a sanction when there is insufficient use within the country to satisfy the demand).
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governments needing to reduce the price of pharmaceuticals, despite
their potential effects on future innovation.121
The best example of this has occurred in Brazil, which some have
described as a “beacon among developing countries.”122 In Brazil, the
government has achieved significant pharmaceutical price reductions
by forcing pharmaceutical companies to manufacture their drugs locally and by threatening compulsory licenses.123 As a result, Brazil
has contained the spread of HIV/AIDS and stabilized the disease.124
In the process, Brazil has saved over $422 million between 1997 and
1999 to offset the $444 million it spent on drugs in 2000.125
With such promising results, it is little wonder that countries like
South Africa, which is battling one of the most severe HIV/AIDS epidemics in the world, have turned to compulsory licensing. According
to 2006 UNAIDS estimates, by the end of 2005, 5.5 million people
were living with HIV in South Africa and almost 1,000 people were
dying from AIDS every day.126 Based on 2002 data, the disease was
predicted to shrink the South African GDP by 17% and reduce output
by $22 billion in 2010.127
Faced with such staggering consequences of inaction on the one
hand and a constitutional mandate to improve access to health care
on the other,128 South Africa became proactive. In 1997, it passed the
Medicines and Related Substances Control Act, empowering the
South African Minister of Health to issue compulsory licenses for
HIV/AIDS drugs for domestic manufacture.129 It was hoped that this
would lower the costs of new antiretroviral drugs, allowing South
Africa to capitalize on their effectiveness and contain the disease.130
Instead, it ignited a firestorm.

121. See Wechkin, supra note 50, at 240.
122. Marques et al., supra note 118, at 472.
123. In 2003, for example, the annual treatment cost for an AIDS patient in Brazil was
$2,000, as compared to $15,000 in the United States. Id. at 472. Furthermore, Brazil has
significantly reduced the production costs of other drugs, including 59% for Efavirenz, 65%
for Nelfinavier, 64% for Nelfinavir, and 63% for Invirase® and Fortovase®. Id. at 474.
124. Rosenberg, supra note 113, at 26 (stating that Brazil has “cut the AIDS death rate
nationally by about 50 percent” and that “each AIDS patient is only a quarter as likely to
be hospitalized as before”).
125. Mullin, supra note 108, at 195.
126. See 2006 JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, supra note 9, annex 1, at 455 (estimating that between 270,000 and 380,000 people died in South Africa as a result of
HIV/AIDS in 2005 and that between 4.9 million and 6.1 million people have the disease).
127. Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic Considerations, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 563 (2002). Fortunately, the tide is beginning to turn for reasons mentioned below, and 2010 does not look as bleak as it did before. See infra notes 14447 and accompanying text.
128. See Bollyky, supra note 110, at 532.
129. Bailey, supra note 86, at 195.
130. See Bollyky, supra note 110, at 534 (stating that new antiretroviral drugs have
slashed mortality rates by seventy percent when compared to previously available treatment).
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2. Compulsory Licensing and the International Consequences
The promise of immediate and improved access to brand name
HIV/AIDS drugs is definitely alluring, but issuing or threatening a
compulsory license has consequences. Compulsory licenses not only
reduce foreign investment, they also impose costs related to litigation, safety, and efficacy.131 More importantly, a compulsory license
can to lead to trade sanctions, especially from the United States, that
halt the license altogether.
The impetus behind such sanctions is the view that when a nation
issues a compulsory license, it reaps the benefits of a substantial research and development investment without contributing its fair
share to the costs.132 As one author has stated:
Research in the area of pharmaceuticals is so expensive that
any country attempting to take a free ride on such research
through the use of compulsory licensing is certain to be a target of
severe international criticism. While developing countries have a
justifiably strong interest in insuring that foods and medicines are
available to their citizens at a reasonable price, they also have a
strong interest in providing the incentive to research those diseases particular to the developing nations.133

In addition, by taking the “free ride” on research with the
compulsory license, a country reaps a competitive trade advantage
because its manufacturers do not have the burden of the substantial
research and development costs.134 This distorts trade, denies innovators the opportunity to recoup their own investments, and prohibits a
developed country from taking advantage of its IP on the international market.135
To avoid this, developed countries like the United States use trade
sanctions and other forms of political pressure against those coun-

131. See id. at 543-44; see also NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF
PATENT RIGHTS 316 (2d ed. 2005) (noting that compulsory licensing discourages the establishment of independent, research-based industries that would be valuable in serving the
local market).
132. See Julian-Arnold, supra note 13, at 357-58.
133. Id. at 368.
134. The effect of not protecting intellectual property among nations is an outgrowth of
the effects within industry. For example, in the context of pharmaceuticals, the ability of a
generic manufacturer to “free-ride” on the research and development of the innovator places the generic at a significant market advantage because, without having to recoup the
same investment costs, it can place an equivalent product on the market for much less.
When this generic manufacturer places its product in channels of international trade,
these effects are magnified and the competitive advantage turns into a trade advantage.
See DE CARVALHO, supra note 131, at 35-36.
135. See Julian-Arnold, supra note 13, at 369 (discussing the theory of comparative advantage in international trade and how the nonprotection of intellectual property puts a
pirating country at an advantage).
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tries whose IP protection is not similar in strength to their own.136 In
the United States, the “Special 301” provisions of the Trade Act of
1974, as amended, empower the U.S. Trade Representative to identify, categorize,137 and investigate foreign countries with inadequate IP
protection for possible future action.138 If a country’s IP protection
falls below the expected threshold, then it is placed on either the
Priority Watch List—where it is subject to further monitoring and
possible subsequent action—or the Watch List—where it is recommended for subsequent action.139 Oftentimes, such action is in the
form of highly persuasive trade sanctions that are meant to encourage a Priority Watch List country to update its IP policies,140 and often these sanctions succeed.141
This was the firestorm that engulfed South Africa. After that
country passed the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act,
the United States placed it on the Watch List, and although no trade
sanctions followed, the mere fear that they would led South Africa to
delay implementing its law.142 Despite this delay, in response to the
Act and as a testament to the effectiveness of compulsory licensing,
drug manufacturers significantly lowered their prices and no doubt
increased access to essential medicines for South Africa and
its citizenry.143
The rest of the world has also responded. In 2003, the United
States began providing direct relief to HIV/AIDS patients via the
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.144 Under this plan, the
United States has provided over $15 billion and will provide $39 bil-

136. Mullin, supra note 108, at 198.
137. Countries are categorized accordingly in the following groups: (1) Priority Foreign
Country; (2) Section 306 Monitoring; (3) Priority Watch List; and (4) Watch List. See U.S.
TRADE REP., 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1 (2005) [hereinafter SPECIAL 301 REPORT].
138. See 19 U.S.C. § 2242(g) (2000) (requiring an annual report to Congress from the
U.S. Trade Representative identifying foreign countries that do not provide adequate intellectual property protection as well as actions taken against them during the preceding
twelve months). See generally SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 137, at 14 (providing an
overview of the statutory reporting process).
139. SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 137, at 14. Subsequent action is authorized by
statute. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000) (authorizing unilateral action against foreign nations that
pursue discriminatory trade practices, including those nations that do not provide adequate intellectual property protection).
140. Rosenberg, supra note 113, at 26 (noting that a country’s inclusion on the Special
301 Watch List is a precursor to trade sanctions).
141. See Wechkin, supra note 50, at 243-45 (describing how New Zealand’s policies,
which were related to compulsory licensing and pharmaceuticals, were repealed after the
United States took the described actions).
142. See Kathy Chenault et al., Will the AIDS Plague Change U.S. Trade Policy?, BUS.
WK., Sept. 13, 1999, at 58; see also Patrick Marc, Compulsory Licensing and the South
African Medicine Act of 1997: Violation or Compliance of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement?, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 109, 110 (2001).
143. See Mullin, supra note 108, at 193.
144. About PEPFAR, http://www.pepfar.gov/about/index.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2009).
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lion more to combat the spread of AIDS worldwide.145 Other countries
and international actors have likewise weighed in to combat the
spread of the disease.146 As a result of their efforts, more than two
million African patients have access to HIV/AIDS drugs that did not
before.147 This increase in access to medicine has lowered the death
rate and controlled the spread of the disease,148 but because the efforts are charitable, this leaves countries like South Africa reliant on
others’ goodwill to battle their health epidemics. Consequently, there
is still a need for a comprehensive, international solution that empowers them to be proactive without fear of international retribution.
As time goes on, this need continues to grow.
III. TRIPS, DOHA, AND THE CURRENT COMPROMISE
Trade disputes like the one above in South Africa did not go unnoticed. While they played out on the world stage, countries recognized
that there was a nexus between trade and IP, and as IP became increasingly important to the developed world,149 these countries saw
that trade could be used as a vehicle for international IP harmoniza-

145. See Win Some, Lose Some: The XVIIth International Aids Conference, ECONOMIST,
Aug. 9, 2008, at 75 (stating that the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief “provides
for $39 billion to be spent on AIDS over the next five years, up from $15 billion for the past
five”).
146. See, e.g., Whalen, supra note 111 (reporting that GlaxoSmithKline PLC “already
sells its HIV drugs in these [poor] countries at not-for-profit prices, and if those prices
aren’t already lower than 25% of the developed-world price, they will be reduced”); see
JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, 2008 REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 13638 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS], available at
http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/2008_Global_report.asp
(describing various ongoing efforts around the globe aiming to combat the spread
of HIV/AIDS).
147. See U.S. President’s Plan for Aids Relief, World AIDS Day 2008: Celebrate Life!,
http://www.pepfar.gov (last visited Apr. 11, 2009) (“When President George W. Bush announced PEPFAR in 2003, it was estimated that only 50,000 people were receiving treatment for HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. Today, PEPFAR supports treatment for more
than 2 million people in sub-Saharan Africa—forty times the number receiving treatment
only five years ago.”); see also Getting the Message, ECONOMIST, June 7, 2008, at 91, available at http://www.economist.com/science/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11487365 (showing
that according to the World Health Organization, over 2 million people are receiving antiAIDS drugs in sub-Saharan Africa); Kimberley A. Strassel, Editorial, The Weekend Interview: Bush on His Record, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2008, at A13 (noting that PEPFAR has
“provided antiretroviral drugs to 2.2 million African HIV-AIDS victims”).
148. See 2008 JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, supra note 146, at 134 (“After
decades of increasing mortality, the annual number of AIDS deaths globally has declined
in the past two years, in part as a result of the substantial increase in HIV treatment
access in recent years.”).
149. As Professor Maskus has shown, strong intellectual property protection is a byproduct of a growing and sophisticated economy. See MASKUS, supra note 7, at 102.
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tion.150 Consequently, they adopted new international trade agreements aimed at standardizing substantive IP protections.
Leading the way were the United States and Europe with a push
to revise the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) at the
Uruguay Round. As part of the Marrakesh Agreement, they pushed
for the adoption of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) annex and succeeded in doing so.151 This was a revolutionary international development. With the adoption of TRIPS,
there was an international power shift from the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO)—a body acting under the United Nations that had routinely failed to obtain substantive harmonization152—to the WTO, which was a successor to the GATT. More importantly, the agreement’s broad scope encompassed areas that previous agreements covered separately153 and, for the first time, included provisions for the enforcement of IP rights.154 Consequently,
TRIPS has been described as the most “comprehensive international
agreement on intellectual property protection ever established.”155
The main objective of TRIPS is to promote free trade.156 With a
mandate “to reduce the distortions and impediments to international
trade, taking into consideration the need to promote effective and
adequate protection for intellectual property rights,”157 it aims to remedy differences in IP protection158 and to protect private property
rights from arbitrary government acts.159
The compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents could arguably be categorized as an arbitrary government act, but this is not
necessarily the case under TRIPS. While an arbitrary compulsory license, which seizes an IP right,160 would be contrary to the mandate
150. Prior international agreements, like the Paris Convention of 1883 and the Patent
Cooperation Treaty, were focused primarily on streamlining international procedures and
had few substantive aspects. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 18, at 331-33.
151. See Mullin, supra note 108, at 187.
152. See Susan Vastano Vaughan, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Under
TRIPS: What Standard of Compensation?, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 87, 93
(2001) (stating that “WIPO negotiations, whether viewed as favorable to developing or developed countries, were routinely stymied”).
153. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 18, at 330-33 (describing how the Paris Convention
and the Patent Cooperation Treaty focused primarily on procedure and stating that individual treaties were used to provide substantive protection).
154. DE CARVALHO, supra note 131, at 28-29.
155. Id. at 28.
156. Id. at 35.
157. See Julian-Arnold, supra note 13, at 370 (citing the Ministerial Declaration on the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations—Statement by the Chairman, 25
I.L.M. 1623 (1986)).
158. DE CARVALHO, supra note 131, at 30.
159. Id. at 35.
160. IP rights are considered private property rights under TRIPS and are therefore
protected from arbitrary government acts. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
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above, one that serves a public purpose161 and is justified on social
and collective interests162 is categorically not. Under TRIPS, promotion of the public health is socially and collectively justifiable, and it
allows its members to adopt any means necessary to serve this end
as long as they are consistent with the remainder of the agreement.163
This includes using compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals.164
After its passing, though, members continually wrestled with interpreting the agreement and with defining the appropriate bases for
issuing a compulsory license. According to Article 31(b), a compulsory
license may issue only once “efforts to obtain authorization from the
right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions” have
failed after a reasonable period of time.165 This negotiation requirement is dispensed with in cases of “national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,”166 but TRIPS does not define what
these are, and when interpreting this language, countries adopted
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. The preambulatory language of the TRIPS agreement specifically “[r]ecogniz[es] that intellectual property rights are private rights.”
TRIPS, supra, pmbl., para. 4.
161. In U.S. law, a taking of private property for a public purpose is authorized under
the Fifth Amendment and carries with it the requirement of just compensation. See U.S.
CONST. amend. V. Partially because of this similarity, this Comment will later use U.S.
law to analyze the TRIPS compensation requirement.
162. DE CARVALHO, supra note 131, at 317.
163. The relevant provision provides that “[m]embers may, in formulating or amending
their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic and technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with
the provisions of this Agreement.” TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 8.
164. The term “compulsory licensing” is not used in the TRIPS agreement, but instead
it is framed as “use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right
holder.” Id. art. 31. When this provision is read in conjunction with Article 2:1, which incorporates Article 5.A.2 of the Paris Convention, it is understood to mean that WTO members may grant compulsory licenses. See Frederick M. Abbott, The TRIPS-Legality of
Measures Taken to Address Public Health Crises: A Synopsis, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 71, 74
(2001).
165. The reasonableness of the negotiations time period is a function of national law
and practice. See DE CARVALHO, supra note 131, at 319.
166. Article 31(b) specifically provides that
such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has
made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful
within a reasonable period of time. This requirement may be waived by a
Member in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency or in cases of public noncommercial use. In situations of national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall,
nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of public
non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without making a
patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent
is or will be used by or for the government, the right holder shall be informed
promptly.
TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 31.
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different meanings.167 This led to subsequent international disputes,
the most notable being the one between the United States and South
Africa. Countries like the United States, for example, believed and
interpreted TRIPS to bar the use of compulsory licenses to treat
HIV/AIDS. Countries like South Africa, on the other hand, interpreted the agreement differently and saw compulsory licenses for the
treatment of HIV/AIDS as fully justified within the agreement.168
Given these conflicting interpretations, on November 14, 2001,
members released the Doha Declaration and clarified the TRIPS position.169 Regarding the availability of compulsory licenses under the
agreement, members declared that not only did each member have
the right to grant compulsory licenses, but that each member also
had the freedom to determine the grounds upon which they are
granted.170 Similarly, regarding the vague “national emergency” or
“other extreme urgency” language that dispensed with the negotiation provisions in Article 31, each member was granted the right to
167. See Vishal Gupta, A Mathematical Approach to Benefit-Detriment Analysis as a
Solution to Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Under the TRIPS Agreement, 13
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 631, 633 (2005) (“As a result of ambiguity in the provisions,
developing nations sought to relax the scope of intellectual property protection required
under TRIPS while developed nations sought to choose a direction to enforce patent rights
strongly.”). The historical background leading up the Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health in Doha on November 14, 2001 and the international disputes over the scope of TRIPS further illustrate this point. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott,
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner
at the WTO, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 469, 470-72 (2002) (describing multiple international conflicts resulting from differing interpretations of the TRIPS provisions, specifically regarding what these provisions would allow and under what circumstances). These disputes
were sourced in the different interpretations that members of the international community
applied to the TRIPS provisions. See id. at 480-83 (describing the various positions segments of the international community took when interpreting TRIPS and the problems
these interpretations caused); see also id. at 493-94 (stating that misperceptions existed
among the press and it was likely to influence how governments would respond).
168. By being a signatory to the TRIPS agreement and by passing its law allowing for
compulsory licenses, South Africa’s actions testified to its belief that compulsory licenses
were allowed. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text (discussing South Africa’s
new law allowing for the use of compulsory licenses); see also Abbott, supra note 167, at
471 (describing South Africa as a country that wanted to use TRIPS for health reform).
When South Africa did delay implementing its law, it did so not because it believed TRIPS
prohibited it, but because of fear that trade sanctions might follow. See Marc, supra note
142, at 110 (“South Africa has halted implementation of the Medicine Act for fear of trade
sanctions.”); see also Steven Lee Myers, South Africa and U.S. End Dispute over Drugs,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1999, at A8 (summarizing that the United States felt the law was too
broad under then-existing trade laws but that it would halt trade sanctions in exchange for
South Africa’s agreement to adopt stricter standards).
169. The Doha Declaration has been declared a victory for both health activists and the
pharmaceutical industry. See Kevin Gopal, New Accord, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE,
Jan. 2002, at 28.
170. Paragraph 5(b) of the Declaration specifically provides that “[e]ach Member has
the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon
which such licences are granted.” World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration
on Public Health].
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determine what constitutes such an emergency and it was recognized
that epidemics such as HIV/AIDS can represent one.171 In doing so, it
was laid to rest whether or not TRIPS would allow compulsory licenses to treat diseases like HIV/AIDS. But, one issue still remains.
If TRIPS is “to reduce the distortions and impediments to international trade,” and if compulsory licenses are a source of such distortions, then how should TRIPS step in when a compulsory license
is issued?
IV. BALANCING TRADE AND PRESERVING INNOVATION: DETERMINING
“ADEQUATE REMUNERATION”
After Doha, it was clear that a TRIPS member could battle
HIV/AIDS and similar health epidemics with compulsory licenses,
but it was not clear what obligations would follow from that decision.
In the agreement’s general terms, these obligations are two-fold.
First, each member, bound by the purpose of the agreement, has the
obligation “to reduce distortions and impediments to international
trade.”172 Second, each member has the obligation to promote technological innovation or at least not to hinder it.173 When a member issues a compulsory license, these general obligations are met in the
one entitlement that the patent holder retains—that of due compensation174 or, as TRIPS provides, “adequate remuneration.”175
But “adequate remuneration” is a vague term open to multiple interpretations, and the uncertainty surrounding it has led some countries to issue or threaten to issue compulsory licenses to bolster domestic industry rather than domestic health,176 a practice that distorts trade, shifts costs, and shackles ongoing innovation efforts.177 In
response, developed countries, fearing that inadequate compensation
will result from the licensing decision, have no incentive to allow the
license to issue and have every incentive to erect trade barriers that
preserve their IP advantages and protect their domestic innovators.
Using such barriers can block compulsory licenses in those countries
171. Paragraph 5(c) of the Declaration provides that “[e]ach Member has the right to
determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency.” Id. para. 5(c).
172. TRIPS, supra note 160, annex 1C, pmbl., para. 1.
173. Id. art. 7 (providing that “[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation”).
174. See DE CARVALHO, supra note 131, at 37-39.
175. See TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 31(h) (providing that “the right holder shall be
paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization” (emphasis added)).
176. See A Gathering Storm, supra note 1.
177. See supra Part II.A.2. (discussing how pharmaceutical innovation efforts are
funded with current revenue); Part II.B.2. (discussing how compulsory licenses distort trade).
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that need them most, and this practice threatens to make Doha
meaningless. In addition, without assurances of adequate compensation, the pharmaceutical industry could likely turn away from researching drugs essential to the developing world, making a dire situation worse.178
Therefore, to preserve the original purposes of TRIPS and Doha, a
member’s obligation to pay “adequate remuneration” must be clarified, and the remainder of this Comment will do just that. Specifically, to avoid the unnecessary consequences above, it will interpret
“adequate remuneration” in a way that discourages countries from
using compulsory licenses to gain an international advantage while
ensuring others that the resulting compensation will be fair. In doing
so, it will outline principles for TRIPS compliance, eliminate noncompliant alternatives, and establish a framework of trade-offs and
considerations that a court or other government body can use when
calculating “adequate remuneration” so that innovation will be preserved, trade balanced, and access enabled.
A. TRIPS Compliance Principles
To ensure that any resulting interpretation of “adequate remuneration” is consistent with TRIPS, it is necessary to establish some
baseline principles to guide the analysis. Such principles must flow
from the document itself and from the agreements of its signatories.179 Therefore, when interpreting “adequate remuneration,” the
analysis begins with the Ministerial Conference’s subsequent declarations and continues with analyzing them in light of individual
TRIPS requirements. This is because “adequate remuneration,” like
the “national emergency” language, is an example of a TRIPS provision left deliberately vague on account of the differing interests and
positions at stake amongst the parties to the agreement. These vague
provisions were included as a compromise, and their meanings are
found in future clarification from decisions of the Dispute Settlement
Body or from subsequent negotiations and agreements of the Ministerial Conference.180 Accordingly, after looking at the Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health from November
14, 2001,181 two principles are discernable.

178. See A Gathering Storm, supra note 1 (summarizing a pharmaceutical chief’s view
that compulsory licensing could deter the drug industry from researching diseases found in
the impoverished areas of the world). But see Whalen, supra note 111 (reporting that
GlaxoSmithKline PLC is increasing its efforts to combat disease in poor countries by
reducing prices and focusing research in neglected areas).
179. See DE CARVALHO, supra note 131, at 31.
180. See id.
181. See Doha Declaration on Public Health, supra note 170.
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The first principle is that compulsory licenses should not be seen
as a “silver bullet” to the world’s health crises, but should instead be
part of a larger and more comprehensive international solution.182 To
preserve this principle, “adequate remuneration” must encompass
some limitation that would prevent the broad use of compulsory licenses. In other words, “adequate remuneration” cannot be interpreted as a bright-line rule or compensation scheme because if it
was, then it would undermine this end. It also would not comply with
Article 31(b)’s preference for negotiation with the patent holder because the certainty of a bright-line rule could encourage broad declarations of “national emergenc[ies] or other circumstances of extreme
urgency” that would dispense with this requirement.183
This is because the certainty afforded by a bright-line rule enables
parties to calculate their legal liabilities a priori, and when a party
believes a future legal remedy will be more beneficial than what can
otherwise be negotiated in a private transaction, that party is likely
to forego the private transaction in favor of the legal remedy.184 In
the context of TRIPS, this means that if a member estimates its
“adequate remuneration” liability and finds it to be more favorable
than what could be negotiated, then that member has an incentive to
exploit the freedom that Doha recognizes185 and declare a circumstance of extreme urgency rather than negotiate with the patent holder.186 Similarly, when the patent holder feels favored by the legal remedy, there is the same incentive to refuse commercially reasonable
terms.187 In both instances, Article 31(b)’s preference for negotia182. Id. para. 2 (providing that TRIPS can only “be part of the wider national and international action to address these [public health] problems”).
183. TRIPS, supra note 160, at 31.
184. This is the reverse proposition of economic theory’s efficient breach of contract.
Under that theory, the bright-line rule of expectation damages allows parties to calculate,
with reasonable certainty, their liabilities for breach of contract prior to breach. When a
breach of contract is efficient (that is when the legal remedy for breach is more favorable
than the costs associated with completing the contract), a party will forego the private,
contractual obligation in favor of the legal remedy. See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing the economic theory of efficient
breach in the context of penalty clauses). Here, it is necessary to avoid the bright-line rule
in order to avoid incentives to disregard preferences for negotiation and private transactions in favor of more beneficial legal remedies.
185. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
186. This is disfavored because of the preference for larger international cooperation
with regard to battling public health crises rather than relying on compulsory licenses to
be a “silver bullet.” See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
187. Encouraging patentees to avoid negotiations would undermine the real value of
the compulsory license, which is the inducement of the patentee to agree to reasonable
terms. See Julian-Arnold, supra note 13, at 364 (suggesting that the reason few compulsory licenses are issued is because of their dormant power to urge successful negotiations);
see also STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS—NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 427, § 248 (1975) (stating that “[t]he practical value . . . of
compulsory license provisions . . . [is that they] usually induce[] the grant of contractual licenses on reasonable terms”).
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tion is undermined, but when the member dispenses with negotiation, the broad use of compulsory licenses is encouraged. Therefore, a
bright-line rule would be contrary to the Declaration188 and inconsistent with the TRIPS mandate189 because it would encourage parties
to ignore procedural requirements in favor of expedience or other
tangible benefit.
The second principle is that “adequate remuneration” cannot defeat the object and purpose of the agreement190 by undermining technological innovation or by harming the public welfare.191 This means
that “adequate remuneration” must account for balancing access to
essential medicines with the incentives to innovate them for tomorrow.192 Consequently, any calculation that does not consider both
perspectives will be inadequate.
B. What Is Not “Adequate Remuneration”
Applying these guiding principles in light of the TRIPS obligations
eliminates two interpretations of “adequate remuneration” and establishes a promising compensation approach.
The first interpretation bases “adequate remuneration” on a lost
profits standard as determined by full market value. This interpretation is inadequate because it defeats the very purpose of the compulsory license within the TRIPS regime. Given that a compulsory license should promote the public health through lower medicine
costs,193 when royalties are based upon lost profits, no subsequent

188. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
189. See TRIPS, supra note 160, pmbl., para. 1 (stating that a desire of the members
was “to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade”); see also supra notes
134-35 and accompanying text (discussing how compulsory licenses introduce international
trade distortions).
190. Doha Declaration on Public Health, supra note 170, para. 5(a) (providing that “[i]n
applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each provision
of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.”).
191. Article 7 contains the objectives of TRIPS and reads as follows:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
See TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 7.
192. This follows from the requirement that IP rights be enforced “to promote technological innovation . . . in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.” Id. Defining “adequate remuneration” in any other way
that does not reflect the interests of both sides would essentially be the same as ignoring
them and would thereby defeat the objective of the agreement as defined in Article 7.
193. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
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price reduction follows.194 This means that access to essential medicines does not increase, and when the “adequate remuneration” calculation does not account for access, it is inconsistent with the second
principle above.195 Therefore, interpreting “adequate remuneration”
as lost profits is inappropriate.
The second interpretation defines “adequate remuneration” as “no
compensation.” Like lost profits, “no compensation” is contrary to the
second principle above because, although such a substantial decrease
in costs increases access, it does not do so “to the mutual advantage
of producers and users of technological knowledge” and is not “in a
manner conducive . . . to a balance of rights and obligations.”196 This
is because “no compensation” means no reimbursement for the necessary investment expended in developing the technology, which does
not advantage the innovator. It also is not conducive to balancing
rights and obligations because it does not account for the IP right,
which, as a recognized private property right,197 requires compensation.198 Moreover, a “no compensation” scheme ignores the “silver bullet” principle because rather than deter the broad use of compulsory
licenses, it encourages it,199 which as previously described, distorts
international trade.200
Instead, to be consistent with both the guiding principles and the
TRIPS obligations, a proper approach calculates “adequate remuneration” in a way that reflects both perspectives of the compulsory licensing dilemma201 and balances them through individual tradeoffs.202 Such a calculation, though complex, preserves the preference
194. See F.M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented
Medicines in Developing Nations, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 913, 921 (2002); see also SCHERER, supra note 64, at 35 (describing that the financial effect of setting royalties at full market
value is the same as exclusive exploitation of the patent by the patentee).
195. TRIPS requires that “adequate remuneration” account for balancing access to essential medicines with the incentives to innovate them for tomorrow. Therefore, both must
be reflected in the calculation. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
196. TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 7. But see Vaughan, supra note 152, at 108 (concluding that based on U.S. precedent and on the inability of developing countries to pay monopoly prices for pharmaceuticals, patent holders for pharmaceuticals in developing nations
are not entitled to any compensation when that country issues a compulsory license).
197. See TRIPS, supra note 160.
198. See DE CARVALHO, supra note 131, at 37-39 (arguing that IP, like private property, requires due compensation when confiscated by the government).
199. Since the first guiding principle disfavors certainty in a priori liability
calculations, “no compensation,” which means there is no liability, will certainly undermine this principle.
200. If inadequate compensation is likely to lead to distortions in international trade,
then “no compensation” will only exacerbate those distortions and be contrary to the very
mandate of TRIPS. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
201. This would make it compliant with the second guiding principle. See supra note
192 and accompanying text.
202. But see JAMES LOVE, REMUNERATION GUIDELINES FOR NON-VOLUNTARY USE OF A
PATENT ON MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 6-7, WHO/TCM/2005.1 (2005), available at
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/technical_cooperation/WHOTCM2005.1_OMS.pdf (ad-
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for negotiation by undermining the certainty of a priori calculations203 and, in addition to balancing the interests of both sides, can
account for other TRIPS requirements.
One such requirement is the requirement that “adequate remuneration” account for the economic value of the authorization,204
particularly in a way that balances incentives for innovation with
access to medicines.205 The complexity of this requirement dictates
that neither a single compensation standard nor a bright-line rule
will be sufficient, but that multiple considerations should be made.
Similarly, TRIPS requires that the basis for a compulsory license be
its individual merits.206 By considering both sides and selecting options that balance their interests, a court can tailor a license’s compensation to the most relevant facts and thereby base it on its individual merits.
C. Calculating “Adequate Remuneration”
Based on the above, if a court is to calculate “adequate remuneration” as a balance of perspectives and as a tailored selection of multiple options, then it must know the parts of “adequate remuneration,” what the options are, and how to consider them within the
proper framework so that a balance can be struck. The analysis below presents these criteria after filtering them from the precedents of
developed countries, and it uses these precedents on the basis of two
theories. One is the theory that compensation schemes in these countries are best at calculating payments so that innovation is not
stifled.207 Another is the theory that a country will be less likely to
respond to a compulsory license with trade sanctions when its own
vocating a simple system to ensure ease of administration, transparency, and predictability for governments with limited capacity to administer a complex, multifactored approach,
but advocating a complex, multifactored approach for countries with the resources necessary to make such administrative determinations); Mark C. Lang, What a Long, Strange
“TRIPS” It’s Been: Compulsory Licensing from the Adoption of TRIPS to the Agreement on
Implementation of the DOHA Declaration, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. 331, 352
(2004) (advocating a bright-line, minimal royalty rate justified on the certainty principle).
203. The complexity of the calculation undermines the certainty here, and it would
make it compliant with the first guiding principle—the “silver bullet” principle. See supra
note 182 and accompanying text.
204. See TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 31(h) (“[T]he right holder shall be paid adequate
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of
the authorization.” (emphasis added)).
205. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
206. See TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 31(a) (requiring that “authorization of such use
shall be considered on its individual merits”).
207. Some may say this assertion is dubious at best because developed countries could
very well be best at preserving innovation because of their reluctance to issue compulsory
licenses and not because their compensation schemes are better than those elsewhere in
the world. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the rarity of compulsory licenses in the United
States). Even if this is the case, one should recognize that this is only a starting point and
not the end of the analysis.
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precedents are used to compensate the patent holder,208 thus avoiding an impediment to trade.209
Relying on these two theories, eminent domain law from the United States has been chosen as the foundation of this analysis. Specifically, this analysis relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1498,210 because like an exercise of eminent domain, a compulsory license must serve a public
purpose and must duly compensate the patentee.211 Informing the
analysis are practices from the United Kingdom and Canada, where
experiences with pharmaceuticals and compulsory licenses have been
the most thorough.212
Excluded from the analysis, though, are compensation schemes
that serve as antitrust remedies because these schemes aim to correct anticompetitive practice, not preserve innovation.213 Moreover,
antitrust remedies fall outside the “adequate remuneration” requirement of TRIPS and therefore remain a separate consideration.214
1. “Adequate Remuneration” Framework
Before presenting various options for determining “adequate remuneration” and outlining a method for making individual tradeoffs, a framework must be established so these options can be placed
208. For example, if the United States is likely to impose trade sanctions when a compulsory license is used, it may be less likely to do so if the patentee receives compensation
in accordance with U.S. law because then the issuing country’s IP protection would more
closely match that of the United States. See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text
(discussing how the United States imposes trade sanctions against those countries whose
IP protection is weaker than is expected).
209. Any compensation method that claims to be TRIPS-compliant must avoid impediments to trade. See TRIPS, supra note 160, pmbl., para. 1.
210. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) provides that
[w]henever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of
the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner’s
remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United States Court
of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation
for such use and manufacture.
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000); see also Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 964 (Ct.
Cl. 1979) (“When the government has infringed, it is deemed to have ‘taken’ the patent license under an eminent domain theory, and compensation is the just compensation required by the fifth amendment.”).
211. See supra notes 162, 198 and accompanying text.
212. See generally David J. Henry, Multi-National Practice in Determining Provisions
in Compulsory Patent Licenses, 11 J. INT’L L. & ECON. 325 (1977) (comparing multinational
practices in compulsory licensing and focusing specifically on practices from Canada and
the United Kingdom because of their multiple decisions in the area and their focus on the
terms of individual licenses).
213. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text (discussing how innovation is essential to the calculation).
214. See TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 31(k) (providing that “[m]embers are not obliged to
apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (f) where such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive”).
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in the proper context. This framework includes defining the component parts of “adequate remuneration” and identifying the steps necessary for determining “adequate remuneration” so that it will be
TRIPS compliant.
Because U.S. eminent domain law is the foundation of this analysis, “adequate remuneration” is defined as a two-part royalty—one
part a compensation base and the other part a royalty rate that applies to that base.215 Fortunately, this coincides well with British and
Canadian practices, which similarly define royalties.216
To ensure TRIPS compliance, a series of steps are needed so that
a court can methodically make its calculation in accordance with the
agreement. To meet this end, it is necessary to recall that TRIPS requires any royalty given in exchange for a compulsory license be
based upon its “economic value”217 as calculated from a perspective
that balances assurances of future technological innovation with the
right to access essential medicines.218 This requires a court to analyze
“economic value” from the perspective of both the patent holder and
the issuing government, with an eye toward balancing an incentive
to innovate for the former and a desire to access for the latter.219
This is a complex arrangement, but various options for both the
compensation base and the royalty rate are available and presented
below to meet this end. Therefore, to make sure that the royalty preserves innovation, the first step in the calculation requires a court to
calculate the royalty in a way that ensures innovation does not suffer. The second step in the calculation requires a court to choose individual options that will decrease the royalty’s total value in light of
the issuing country’s capacity to pay. By doing so, a court ensures
that access is maintained and that the purpose of the compulsory license is not defeated. Although this may result in a royalty that is
215. See ITT Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 199, 202 (1989) (“One approach . . . [is]
to determine an applicable compensation base and to apply a reasonable royalty rate to
this figure.”).
216. In the United States, there is also an additional compensation element of “delay
compensation” that is meant “to accomplish complete justice as between the plaintiff and
the United States.” Waite v. United States, 282 U.S. 508, 509 (1931). This element is not
found in the compensation schemes of the United Kingdom and Canada when applied to
pharmaceuticals, no doubt because these countries did not seize the technology but only
dictated the terms for its license. This points out a resulting discontinuity of starting with
28 U.S.C. § 1498, and to avoid it, this Comment does not discuss or include it. It seems
reasonable, however, that if an issuing country includes “delay compensation” in its eminent domain compensation calculation or seizes the pharmaceutical for state distribution,
then this component can be included as well.
217. See TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 31(h) (“[T]he right holder shall be paid adequate
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of
the authorization.” (emphasis added)).
218. This is merely a restatement of the second principle described earlier. See supra
notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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not ideal from an innovation perspective, it is necessary to account
for both perspectives.220
Therefore, “adequate remuneration” consists of two parts—a compensation base and a royalty rate that applies to that base. For both
parts, various options exist for a court to consider, and a court should
begin by determining a compensation base and royalty rate that is
innovation-centric. Next, in light of the country’s capacity to pay, it
should consider other options for the royalty’s parts and make individual trade-offs that afford access.
Finally, to ensure TRIPS compliance, a validation step is necessary to judge the royalty’s reasonableness in light of the innovation
and access restraints.221 Only by validating the royalty with some objective measure can a court ensure the proper balance has been
struck. For this reason, the final step in the calculation is a validation step that requires a court to evaluate the reasonableness of its
“adequate remuneration” determination.
2. Determining a Royalty Rate
If the basis for a compulsory license is its individual merits,222
then when considering the proper royalty rate, a court must first
consider the surrounding facts. In doing so, the court can initially determine whether or not defining “adequate remuneration” according
to the scheme proposed above is overly complex. That is, in some situations, the facts may dictate that an easier method for compensating the patent holder is available. And when available, a court can
embrace it, conserving precious judicial resources in the process.
Should the court decide otherwise, then as the first step in determin-

220. Note that innovation is not a function of one country’s royalty but is a function of
the compensation system’s ability to control costs. Here, the proposed framework attempts
to calculate an “ideal” royalty that reflects the cost of innovation and then brings it into
harmony with an individual country’s access abilities to make it “fair.” Therefore, consumers benefit from lower costs and any resulting harms to innovation are contained. See John
H. Barton, The Economics of TRIPS: International Trade in Information-Intensive Products, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 473, 489-90 (2001) (discussing that under TRIPS, forms
of international IP protection must provide long-term benefits to innovation that outweigh
the costs to the world’s consumers and that the global allocation of innovation costs should
be fair).
221. This practice also is derived from U.S. law. See Leesona Corp. v. United States,
599 F.2d 958, 973 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (stating that “one way to monitor the reasonableness of
our determination of just compensation is to compute the award by estimating a reasonable royalty on a proper compensation base, and then test this award by an examination of
other available measures”).
222. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing the “individual
merits” requirement).
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ing the proper compensation base and royalty rate, the court can calculate the “economic value” of the license.223
Under U.S. law, when valuating a compulsory license, a court
looks to the surrounding facts, particularly the terms of the license
such as its scope and duration.224 Since TRIPS requires that “the
scope and duration of . . . [the license] be limited to the purpose for
which it was authorized,” then depending on the purpose, some licenses may be very short.225 In these instances, rather than establish
a two-part royalty, a court may simply lengthen the patent term,
similar to what is done in the United States under the HatchWaxman Act.226 Passed in response to previous legislation allowing
generic manufacturers to intrude upon patents for the sake of regulatory approval,227 this Act seeks to remedy the harm to the patent
holder that results from a temporary intrusion by preserving the effective life of the patent.228
This approach could very well be the best for a court because it
partially avoids the valuation problem, but unfortunately, it will likely be inappropriate for most pharmaceutical cases.229 When dealing
with health crises like HIV/AIDS that require long-term treatment or
when a short-term intrusion on the patent will result in a much lower probability that the innovator will recover the associated costs
223. As will be shown, both sides must be accounted for because it is the only way that
a license can balance incentives for innovation with the need to access essential medicines.
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
224. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). Although royalty determinations often cite Georgia-Pacific, a court should
distinguish it because it was decided under 35 U.S.C. § 284. Although there are a number
of overlapping factors when calculating compensation rates based on 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and
35 U.S.C. § 284, infringements under the former are thought of as an “ ‘eminent domain
taking of a patent license,’ ” not a tort claim like infringements under the latter. See ITT
Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 199, 202 (1989).
225. See TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 31(c) (providing that “the scope and duration of
such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized, and in the case of
semi-conductor technology shall only be for public non-commercial use or to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive”).
226. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28,
and 35 U.S.C.).
227. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) provides that
[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within
the United States or import into the United States a patented invention . . .
solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs or veterinary biological products.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
228. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2000) (allowing for an extension of patents that are
subject to regulatory review for a period that is no greater than the period required to
obtain approval).
229. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing how the valuation problem
leads courts to issue injunctions as remedies).
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over time,230 simply lengthening the patent term will be ineffective
because, in both cases, the patent holder’s opportunity to recover
costs and reinvest them for development is lost.231
If this is the case, then a court should opt for the royalty-based
compensation scheme and begin its analysis by determining the
“economic value” of the license to the patent holder.232 This can be
done in two ways under U.S. law. One way uses the comparative
royalty technique, and the other compensates the patent holder by
valuating what was lost.
Under the comparative royalty technique, a court analyzes the
remainder of the license’s terms and compares them with similar licenses.233 If similar licenses are found and indicate an already established royalty, then the court adopts that royalty.234 If no similar licenses and established royalties are found, then the other option under U.S. law is to valuate what the patent holder has lost.235 In this
respect, since the “economic value” determination must preserve the
incentive to innovate,236 a suitable royalty rate should account for innovation and its attendant innovation variables—the costs of innovation and invention, the risks, the potential payoffs that accompany
success, and the rate of competitive imitation.237
Hence, when defining a royalty in terms of what the innovator has
lost, the first variable—the cost of innovation and invention—is
simply an accounting for the costs to develop the drug as well as to
230. No specific examples are apparent to the author at this time, but one can imagine
the case of a specialty drug specifically engineered to combat a sudden pandemic. If the
probability of this pandemic is relatively low, so that it can only be expected to occur once
during the patent’s term, then an intrusion on the patent without sufficient compensation
during this period would have a harmful effect since for the remainder of the patent term,
the demand will be significantly lower. As a result, if denied compensation when demand
is highest, the likelihood of recovering the development costs will be much lower.
231. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing how innovation in the
pharmaceutical industry sprouts from a company’s ability to recover costs through sales of
patented products).
232. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text (discussing why “economic value”
must be determined from both the patent holder’s and issuing country’s perspectives).
233 See Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 973 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (discussing
the comparative royalty technique for defining royalties and stating that “[t]he comparative royalty technique is the preferred method of determining just compensation”).
234. Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 347 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (stating that
when “an established royalty rate for the patented inventions is shown to exist, that rate
will usually be adopted as the best measure of reasonable and entire compensation”); see,
e.g., ITT Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 199, 223-40 (1989) (using a comparison of similar licenses to provide a basis for determining just compensation).
235. See Leesona, 599 F.2d at 969, 972, 977 (describing the value to the patentee as a
basis for compensation, stating that “[t]he proper measure in eminent domain is what the
owner has lost” and stating further that “[t]he just compensation to which an owner is entitled when his property is taken by eminent domain is regarded . . . from the point of view
of the owner of the right and not from that of the taker”).
236. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
237. See supra Part II.A.2.
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bring it to market.238 These costs are particularly relevant because
they are the costs that any potential licensee will be “free-riding”
upon,239 and precedent for reimbursing them is found in the United
Kingdom under Section 41 of its Patents Act of 1949. Under this Act,
courts aimed to provide a “reasonable advantage” to the patent holder
while also finding the lowest possible prices for drugs.240 This “reasonable advantage” came in the form of a multielement royalty rate with
one element accounting for the drug’s research and marketing costs.241
Beginning with research costs, the British courts gave compensation according to the industrial practice for funding research.242 Consequently, since the pharmaceutical industry funds current research out
of current sales,243 the first royalty percentage element should be a
percentage defined as the ratio of total research expenses to world
sales, as defined by the patent holder’s balance sheet.244 The basis for
this ratio can either be the world sales of all products, which is more
favorable to an issuing country, or the world sales of all researchdeveloped products, which is friendlier to the patent holder.245 In either case, this royalty element is both simple to calculate and administer in comparison to a more exacting alternative that would determine
how much a particular drug’s profits fund total research efforts.246
The next cost category is marketing costs, or promotion costs, and
once again, British practice provides a model. Justified on the theory
that promotion costs are part of the benefit that a licensee receives
from the promotion of the drug by the patent holder,247 the British
238. One could also argue that a royalty should include attorneys’ fees as well since
these are costs employed in obtaining an “adequate remuneration” that preserves innovation incentives. Attorneys’ fees, however, are specifically excluded in U.S. law and thus this
Comment does not include them. Traditionally, under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, attorneys’ fees
have not been awarded except in a limited number of statutory exceptions contained therein. Since the traditional view is that attorneys’ fees are a punitive award, U.S. courts have
declined to include them when determining just compensation after the government takes
a patent. See Leesona, 599 F.2d at 970; see also Dohaney v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 368
(1930) (holding that the just compensation award that follows an eminent domain taking
does not include attorneys’ fees).
239. See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
240. “In settling the terms of licenses under the section the Comptroller shall endeavour to secure that food, medicines, and surgical and curative devices shall be available to
the public at the lowest prices consistent with the patentees deriving a reasonable advantage from their patent rights.” J.R. Geigy S.A.’s Patent, [1964] R.P.C. 391, 398 (U.K.) (citing section 41(2) of the Patents Act of 1949); see also Henry, supra note 212, at 329.
241. See J.R. Geigy, [1964] R.P.C. at 398.
242. See Henry, supra note 212, at 331 (noting that British courts adopted this industrial practice when determining the research element of a royalty).
243. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
244. See F. Hoffman-La Roche & Co. A.G.’s Patent, [1973] R.P.C. 601, 606 (U.K.).
245. Friendliness to either party is a function of the divisor in the ratio. A constant dividend divided by a larger divisor results in a smaller percentage and thus favors the issuing country. A smaller divisor would likewise favor the patent holder.
246. See F. Hoffman-La Roche, [1973] R.P.C. at 607.
247. J.R. Geigy S.A.’s Patent, [1964] R.P.C. 391, 400 (U.K.).
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courts apportioned the patent holder’s marketing expenditures
across a number of categories—such as clinical trials, advertising expenses, marketing activity, and administrative costs—and included
them as elements within the royalty rate.248 Such a scheme in the international context would necessarily be case-specific and would require a court to make individualized findings. These findings would
reflect the promotion funds expended and expected to be lost as a result of the license, and a court reimbursing costs based on these findings should use British practices as a guide.249
When compensating for risk, the second innovation variable, there
are two approaches. The first compensates directly for risk by accounting for failures and successes. The second compensates through
an arbitrary profit element added to the royalty rate. The British
courts used both.
For example, when calculating the research element of the royalty
percentage, British courts accounted for all funded research activity.
Believing this to be “the only realistic method of recovering research
costs,”250 the courts determined a royalty rate that compensated for
both successes and failures that occur in the research process and
thereby accounted for risk.251
A court wishing to account for risk in the royalty rate could easily
adopt this model, but should it fall short, the court could continue to
follow the British model and add an arbitrary profit element to the
royalty rate.252 Based on prior practices, this profit element sometimes reached as high as 22.5% of those costs incurred for research
and promotion.253
At first glance, such a high profit element may be difficult to justify solely as a matter of risk. But risk is only part of the innovation
picture. When the detrimental effects that a compulsory license has
on innovation are also considered, such a high profit element is easier to accept. In other words, using such a high profit element may only be justifiable after remembering that the compulsory license nullifies two of the four innovation variables. Specifically, when the license is issued, there is no longer any barrier to competitive imitation,254 and as that competition enters the market, the patent’s poten-

248. Henry, supra note 212, at 332.
249. See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche, [1973] R.P.C. at 612 (summarizing how promotion
costs were apportioned).
250. J.R. Geigy, [1964] R.P.C. at 400.
251. See Henry, supra note 212, at 341.
252. See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche, [1973] R.P.C. at 617.
253. See Henry, supra note 212, at 330 n.17.
254. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text (discussing why, in the pharmaceutical context, patents are the most effective barrier to competitive imitation).
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tial reward is diminished.255 Therefore, this additional profit element
in the royalty rate is justified not only because of risk, but also because of the entry of competition and the erosion in expected profits
for the patent holder.256
Furthermore, because the loss of expected profits is relevant to
the profit element, a court should also consider the particular characteristics of the licensed drug.257 That is, a court should assess whether the drug can be described as a “blockbuster” drug because “blockbuster” drugs fund the majority of research and development activities.258 If the drug is a “blockbuster,” then it weighs in favor of a
higher profit element.
In sum, to compensate for innovation when no comparable royalty
exists and when lengthening the patent term is insufficient, a court
should rely on a royalty rate that consists of the sum of three elements—a research element consisting of a ratio of research and development costs to sales, a promotions costs element defined according to an individual apportionment of expenses, and a profit element.
This is not the end of the calculation, however, because as previously described, “adequate remuneration” must account for access,
and the final compensation must reflect this.259 Therefore, if the
royalty rate does not afford access, a court must decrease it until it
reaches a balance between access and innovation. In the context
of the above analysis, some of the options presented would lessen the
total royalty, but assuming this is not enough, other options
are available.
These options exist under Section 41 of the Canadian Patent Act
of 1969 where compensation was primarily a function of “the value of
the use . . . to the licensee,”260 but because they do not fold well into
the previously described innovation variables, they should not be re255. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (discussing the patent’s effect on recovering costs).
256. See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche, [1973] R.P.C. at 608 (noting that the profit element reflects the monopoly situation the patent provided prior to the license). This is not
the end of the inquiry when considering expected profits. See infra Part IV.C.4 (describing
how expected profits should be used to validate the royalty).
257. See, e.g., Charles Pfizer & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd., [1970] 65 C.P.R. 132, 142-43
(Can.) (considering the importance of the drug Terramycin when evaluating the appropriateness of the royalty).
258. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 5 (noting that brand-name companies heavily rely on a small number of “ ‘blockbuster’ ” drugs to recoup their innovation
investments, including those made for failed products).
259. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
260. Henry, supra note 212, at 340. While the Canadian practice addresses value to the
“licensee,” this Comment places the issuing government in this role since both are primarily interested in minimizing acquisition costs. The only difference is that the licensee wishes to maximize profits while the issuing government wishes to maximize access. In both,
the means are the same because lower total acquisition costs act as an enabler to achieve
the desired end.
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lied on in absence of other considerations. To do so would not serve
innovation well,261 but they are options that Canada has employed to
improve access to drugs in the past.
For example, when compensating the patent holder for the research and promotion costs of a particular drug, Canadian courts limited research costs to those leading to the invention and did not include any compensation for failures.262 Furthermore, the courts did
not compensate for promotion costs, and they specifically excluded
postinvention expenses.263
Instead, Canadian practice surveyed the market landscape, taking account of the prior art, commercial surveys, and other market
conditions,264 and it focused on the total sum of the potential royalties
over the life of the license.265 In the end, most compulsory licenses resulted in an arbitrarily assessed rate of four percent266 or fifteen percent,267 depending upon the royalty’s compensation base.268
Using these practices as a guide, a court desiring to lower a potential royalty to increase access can easily do so, but it should not rely
on these practices in isolation. Instead, a court should only rely on
the Canadian model in conjunction with the British model. In this
way, a court can temper what some economists have described as the
Canadian courts’ tendency to undercompensate the patent holder
and to harm innovation.269 For this reason, while Canadian practices
cannot provide a complete solution to the compensation equation,
they do provide courts a balancing tool. That is, when balancing the
need for access in developing countries with innovation incentives, a
court can look to Canadian practices to reduce the overall royalty
and, in doing so, can ensure that the capacity to pay does not remain
a barrier to medicinal access.
261. See Grabowski, supra note 66, at 855 (noting that the historical Canadian approach “strongly discouraged investment in . . . domestic industry”).
262. See Henry, supra note 212, at 340 (noting that this research component could be
nonexistent in the final royalty calculation).
263. Id. at 340-41.
264. Id. at 341.
265. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Frank W. Horner Ltd., [1970] 65 C.P.R. 93,
112 (Can.).
266. Henry, supra note 212, at 341. This figure is also very similar to at least one proposal for “adequate remuneration” that suggests rates between three percent and five percent based on international comparisons and proposals from pharmaceutical representatives. See Lang, supra note 202, at 353.
267. Henry, supra note 212, at 341 n.63.
268. Royalty-based options are discussed infra Part IV.C.3. Under the Canadian model, a four percent royalty is applied to the net selling price, and a fifteen percent royalty is
applied to the bulk sale price. See Henry, supra note 212, at 341.
269. See, e.g., J.R. Geigy S.A.’s Patent, [1964] R.P.C. 391, 406 (U.K.) (calculating the
royalty to be sixteen percent of the drug’s selling price in the U.K., which would exceed the
four percent rate applied to the selling price of the drug in Canada); see Grabowski, supra
note 66, at 855 (noting that the historical Canadian approach “strongly discouraged investment in . . . domestic industry”).
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3. Determining a Compensation Base
Two options exist for the compensation base, and because both
have their own implications, both should be considered in light of the
royalty rate when balancing access rights with innovation incentives.
One option for the compensation base is the selling price of the
drug as defined on an annual treatment or per dosage basis.270 Using
this option for a royalty base ties the royalty to the current market
price and favors access rights because the royalty will decrease as
the license’s effect permeates throughout the local market. In other
words, after a court issues the compulsory license, generics will
quickly enter the market and cause a drop in the market price.271
Over time, prices will continue to drop as supply increases to satisfy
demand, and this will increase access, but it will also decrease the
patent holder’s royalty.272 To repair this effect, some courts in the
United Kingdom relied upon future projections to calculate an “uplift” percentage that would offset the corresponding reductions and
align the total royalty with its intended value.273 Courts concerned
with innovation effects and attempting to balance rights under
TRIPS can easily do the same.
In the alternative, a second and innovation-friendlier option uses
the price-per-kilogram, or bulk sale price, of the active, manufactured substance as the compensation base. This alternative insulates
the patent holder from market price reductions and ensures some
stability because the bulk sale price is relatively stable in comparison
to the dosage price.274 On the other hand, it may have a harmful side
effect and keep prices artificially high,275 and in light of this, a court
may wish to adjust the compensation base or royalty rate accordingly.
4. Validating the Whole: Ensuring that
“Adequate”

Remuneration Is

Finally, a court striving to weigh these factors in an effort to
balance innovation and access requires some form of validation to
judge the reasonableness of the final assessment. Under U.S. law,
royalties are validated by comparing the royalty to what has been

270. See Henry, supra note 212, at 335-36.
271. See, e.g., Marques et al., supra note 118, at 474 (reflecting the market price reductions that follow compulsory license awards).
272. See F. Hoffman-La Roche & Co. A.G.’s Patent, [1973] R.P.C. 601, 608-09 (U.K.).
273. Henry, supra note 212, at 336.
274. See id. (describing the effect of this alternative as ensuring the patentee receives
full and adequate recovery for the associated costs in developing and marketing the drug,
which otherwise could be defeated by the decreasing royalty amounts that result from decreasing prices in a competitive market).
275. See J.R. Geigy S.A.’s Patent, [1964] R.P.C. 391, 402 (U.K.) (discussing how this alternative might keep prices higher despite the compulsory license).
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gained and lost from each side.276 Therefore, since U.S. law provides
the baseline for this analysis, assessments of the license’s “economic
value” from the perspectives of the issuing government and the patent holder are necessary.
Beginning with the issuing government, a court analyzing the
reasonableness of its economic value determinations should assess
the savings to the government and its needy consumers. While such
savings are not awardable to the patent holder, they are an acceptable measure of the royalty’s reasonableness and should give an indication of its effect on public access.277 This then should be compared
to the license’s economic value to the patent holder. In this regard,
when evaluating the patent holder’s economic value, a court should
assess the profits that have been lost by comparing expected profits if
the license had not been issued to the expected profits that will result
from the license.278 In this way, a court can evaluate the profit differential and rudimentarily forecast the potential effects on innovation
since profits fund current research.
Consideration of this last factor, lost expected profits, has an added benefit. It encourages Ramsey pricing—a practice that is preferred because it tends to set price points in a way that maximizes
access to essential drugs.279 A patent holder who sells a patented
drug in a country at a price that substantially limits access will lose
less profit when a court issues a compulsory license, and if there is
little profit expectation from a particular market, then it is not likely
to fund future research. This means that the loss of that market
should not hinder innovation. If Ramsey pricing is used, then a patent holder aims to maximize profits within a particular market by
setting a lower price,280 making it more likely that the market will
fund future innovation efforts. Therefore, when lost expected profits
276. Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 973 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (“[O]ne way to
monitor the reasonableness and fairness of our determination of just compensation is to
compute the award by estimating a reasonable royalty on a proper compensation base, and
then test this award by an examination of other available measures—savings to the government, lost profits, etc.”).
277. See id. at 971 (discussing the role of savings to the government within the assessment of royalties under 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
278. The profits discussed here, however, are distinguishable from the “full market
value” measure of lost profits discussed previously. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text. Here, the lost profits discussed refer to the profit the patent holder expected from
the lost market, not the actual lost profit per dose, and are a function of access within the
affected market. Furthermore, under U.S. law, which supplies the foundation for this
analysis, actual lost profits are not available as a remedy under an eminent domain taking.
Instead, they are only available as a remedy under a tort theory of damages. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978) (discussing how lost profits are obtained in a private infringement action under 35 U.S.C. § 284).
279. See generally Scherer & Watal, supra note 194, at 925-28 (discussing Ramsey pricing and the benefits it provides in providing access to medicines in the developing world).
280. Id. at 927.
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are high, a higher royalty is warranted, but when they are low, the
opposite is true.
V. CONCLUSION
Admittedly, the above interpretation of “adequate remuneration”
is a complex determination. For this reason, some may critique it as
impractical and disfavored in light of simpler, more straightforward
solutions.281 For those who do, it is worthwhile to note that the standard above is not complex without reason.
One reason for such complexity lies in the difficulty of accurately
valuating patented technology. As this Comment previously described, in some circumstances courts can avoid this difficulty by issuing injunctions and by relying on parties to negotiate the valuation
issue outside of court, but in the TRIPS context, this alternative is
unavailable. Instead, when an issuing government compels licensing
of a patent through a compulsory license, negotiation opportunities
are lost, and only the compensation decision remains.
Another reason for the complexity resides in the nature of TRIPS.
By requiring that each license reflect its “individual merits” and its
“economic value,” TRIPS makes bright-line standards unpalatable
and necessitates a factual, case-by-case analysis. This becomes even
more necessary when recognizing that “adequate remuneration”
must balance the interests of innovation and access. The divergence
of these two interests leaves a court bridging a gap that may at first
appear insurmountable, but by making individual trade-offs in light
of the circumstances of each individual case, a court can build a
bridge that may not be perfect, but can work.
Finally, “adequate remuneration” is complex because it ensures
that compulsory licenses are available, but not abused. When
compensation for patented technology is minimal, it encourages
countries to take the expedient route, avoiding negotiation with the
patent holder and shifting costs in the process. This, in turn, can result in trade sanctions or other forms of international retaliation
from those countries that have the most to lose in terms of trade. In
the end, the license is halted despite the issuing country’s capacity to
pay, and without the license, drugs remain out of reach, suffering
continues, and the international solution to issues of public health becomes meaningless.
When compensation is “adequate,” as based on a number of factors derived from the source agreement, however, costs may still be
shifted, but they are also minimized. Consequently, the likelihood

281. See, e.g., supra note 202 (listing alternative compensation schemes based on principles of administration capacity and certainty).
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that the license will impact ongoing research is greatly diminished,
as is the incentive for protectionist behavior in the international arena. Developed countries, for example, that would otherwise block a
compulsory license to preserve their trade advantages have less incentive to do so when their innovators are fairly compensated. Similarly, countries with the capacity to pay for pharmaceutical technology have no incentive to issue a compulsory license to bolster their
domestic pharmaceutical industries when the attendant compensation fairly denies them the advantage they seek. This not only preserves the international solution, but it also preserves compulsory licenses as a viable alternative for those countries that need them most.
The method that this Comment presents is complex for all of these
reasons, but especially because it strives to satisfy today’s short-term
needs without sacrificing those of tomorrow. Because access and innovation are intertwined, the necessity of a sufficient royalty is paramount to seeing that the former does not sacrifice the latter and
vice versa. In other words, the compensation scheme described here,
by providing a path for meeting our present needs without risking
the future’s, saves tomorrow from today.

